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introduction1
Good governance is not a new concept  Ambrogio Lorenzetti made his frescoes on 
good and bad governance already in the years 1338-1340  They can be viewed in the 
Palazzo Publicco on one of the most beautiful squares of the world, the Piazza del 
Campo in Siena, Italy  I assume many of you have been there  Good governance is 
represented by a king on his throne surrounded by many virtues  Bad governance is 
represented by the devil, and justice has been bound  The fresco depicting the conse-
quences of good governance shows an orderly and happy life  People pay taxes, and 
many people are engaged in productive and cultural activities  The city state of Siena 
itself served as model for this condition of good governance, and Siena can be rec-
ognized on the fresco  The frescoes on the consequences of bad governance are less 
well remained  But the overwhelming image is one of death and destruction  Houses 
are burning, nobody is working on the land  Lorenzetti’s frescoes were innovative in 
his time, especially for painting a humanistic and not religious topic (Korsten, 2010) 
The attention for good governance in more recent times received a boost after the 
fall of the Berlin wall  The then ailing field of comparative economic systems suddenly 
became alive and kicking  This sub-discipline within economics had for a long time 
compared the economic systems and performance of what was then called Eastern 
Europe, with systems and performance of Western countries  More generally this field 
studied the impact of institutions on countries’ economic performance and needless 
to say, it was my favourite sub-discipline  After 1990, many countries began a transi-
tion from centrally planned economies to market economies and this brought re-
newed interest in the role of institutions in economic performance (Eggertsson, 1990; 
North, 1990)  
At the same time, the end of the Cold War implied that good governance also be-
came more important in development cooperation policies  Until then, dictators like 
Mobutu in Zaire or Marcos in The Philippines had been supported with Western aid 
in order to keep them outside of the communist sphere of interest  This is reflected 
in a statement reportedly ascribed to President Roosevelt on Anastasio Somoza, who 
governed Nicaragua as a ruthless dictator: “he may be a son of a bitch, but he is our 
son of a bitch” 2 From the 1990s onward, aid receiving developing countries were 
now also expected to respect human rights, to organize elections and to create trans-
parent and effective government bureaucracies  Donors increasingly began to view 
promoting democracies, human rights including gender rights, and effective states as 
important objectives of foreign aid 
This interest in good governance in both research and policy circles has led to the 
development of indicators to measure good governance  There are commercially 
developed assessments such as the International Country Risk Guide scores on eco-
nomic, political and financial risks, and the Freedom House scales for political and civil 
1  The author thanks Tom Groot for helpful comments to an earlier version of this text, and Janneke ‘t Hart 
for editorial assistance with the text of the acknowledgements 
2  This Somoza ruled from 1936 intil his death in 1956, and was then succeeded by his two sons  The family 
reigned until 1979 
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good governance and development
When we look at Lorenzetti’s frescos it is immediately clear that good governance 
is important for development  It is also in line with economic and political theories  
If private property is not protected and if citizens cannot go to independent courts 
when their rights are affected, economic transactions will not take place easily and 
there are no incentives for investment  At the same time, governments will become 
more effective in providing social and economic infrastructure when they can be held 
to account by citizens who can freely express their opinions  In order to test these 
relationships I use data on the WGI indicators and compare them with data from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators database, for non OECD countries  
Figure 2. Correlation between rule of law and logarithm of GDP per capita in 2000
Source: Own elaboration of data from www.govindicators.org and from World Bank, World 
Development Indicators online.
In line with theory and with intuition, there appears to be a close relationship be-
tween one of the good governance indicators, rule of law,4 and average income per 
capita in the same year (Figure 2)  However, this is an association and we cannot 
conclude yet on the direction of causality  Does improvement in the rule of law lead 
to higher levels of development, or does economic development enhance the rule of 
law?
If good governance is important for development, we should be able to establish a 
relationship between the quality of governance in a particular year, and economic 
4   Rule of law is about “extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence” (Kaufmann et al , 2010: 4)  
Good Governance DevelopmentAid ➨ ➨
rights  Next to this there are indicators developed by international agencies such as 
UNDP and the World Bank, and those developed by independent institutions or re-
search agencies, including Polity IV, Transparency International Corruption Perception 
Index and the Bertelsmann’s Transformation Index (BTI)  The Bertelsmann’s founda-
tion also developed sustainable governance indicators for the 31 OECD countries  Our 
department of Public Administration and this Bertelsmann Foundation have taken 
first steps in cooperation  The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) developed by 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoboi-Lobaton of the World Bank Institute are special in that 
they use and combine 30 different sources3 including most of the earlier mentioned 
sources but also population surveys such as Latinobarometer or Afrobarometer  The 
availability of these good governance indicators helps researchers to examine the 
relationship between good governance and development and helps donors to define 
their aid policies 
So far I haven’t defined good governance explicitly yet  Usually two dimensions of 
good governance are distinguished, namely elements that concern the access to au-
thority, and elements that concern the exercise of authority (Rothstein and Teorell, 
2008)  The WGI distinguishes three dimensions  The first is about the process whereby 
governments are selected, monitored and replaced, represented by ‘voice and ac-
countability’, and ‘political stability’  These indicators can be said to cover the access 
to authority  Then there are two dimensions covering the earlier mentioned exercise 
of authority: the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement 
sound policies (with indicators ‘government effectiveness’ and ‘regulatory quality’) 
and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic 
and social interactions (with indicators ‘rule of law’ and ‘control of corruption’) (Kauf-
mann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2010) 
Now, after this introduction, which also served for providing you with a bird’s eye 
view of my chaotic academic interests over time, let me take you to the main topic of 
this lecture  The accepted donor wisdom is that aid promotes good governance, and 
that good governance fosters development (Figure 1)  In the following, I will question 
this accepted wisdom  I will show that there are some paradoxes in both relationships, 
beginning with the one between good governance and development  For each of 
the two paradoxes, I will also offer some explanations and solutions, part of which 
consist of further research  In the conclusion, I summarize the argument and sketch 
my research agenda  
Figure 1. 
    
3 See www govindicators org  The number of sources has varied over time and wag higher in earlier years  
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Figure 4.  Government effectiveness in 2000, and change in HDI score between 2000 and 2010 
Source:  Own elaboration of data from www.govindicators.org and from 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/   Notes: AFG: Afghanistan, ZWE: Zimbabwe.
These are all correlations  But if we assume that growth is influenced by good gov-
ernance, we must also control for other variables that may influence growth  In order 
to control for these other variables, I also conducted multivariate regression analy-
sis  As also done by other authors (Arndt and Oman, 2006; Kaufmann and Kraay, 
2002), I included the investment rate (investment/GDP in percent, average over 2001-
2010), average population growth 2001-2010, and the level of GDP per capita in 2000 
(measured as logarithm of GDP per capita)  The investment rate is expected to have 
a positive effect on growth per capita, and population growth is expected to have a 
negative influence  The level of income in 2000 is included to account for the con-
vergence effect: countries with lower initial income per capita usually have higher 
growth rates  Given that the good governance indicators are highly correlated among 
each other, they are included one by one in the regression 
The results largely confirm the bivariate conclusion: while all three control variables 
have the expected sign and are significant, the good governance indicator ‘govern-
ment effectiveness’ is not significant, and ‘voice and accountability’ and ‘rule of law’ 
even have a negative and significant (5 per cent level) effect on growth per capita  
When regressing the change in the HDI on several good governance indicators and 
controlling for other variables, the only variable with a significant (and positive) influ-
ence on the change in HDI proved to be average growth rate per capita  Good gov-
ernance indicators did not have a significant influence, with the exception of voice 
and accountability, which had a significant but negative influence on this change  
Appendix tables 1 and 2 show the results of these regressions  Apparently, there is no 
relationship between good governance and development: the first paradox 
growth in subsequent years  Figure 3 shows the relationship between rule of law 
in 2000, and average annual growth rates per capita in the years 2001-2010 for 120 
countries  We must conclude that there is no relationship between these two  ‘Rule of 
law’ has been most often used in the literature to examine the relationship between 
good governance and development  But when we take ‘voice and accountability’ (an 
indicator of democracy) or ‘government effectiveness’, we get similar results: there is 
no significant relationship 
Perhaps good governance, and in particular ‘government effectiveness’ and ‘voice 
and accountability’, are more important for a broader development concept, also in-
cluding access to education and health care? For this reason we also plot the change 
in UNDP’s Human Development Index between 2000 and 2010 against some of the 
good governance indicators  The HDI is an unweighted average of three variables: 
income per capita, an education variable consisting of combined enrolment rates and 
literacy rates, and a health variable measured as life expectancy at birth  Again, if 
anything, there proves to be a negative relationship (Figure 4), and the same holds 
for voice and accountability (not shown)  
Figure 3.  Rule of Law in 2000, and annual average growth rates per capita, 2001-2010, in %
Source: Own elaboration of data from www.govindicators.org and from World Bank, World 
Development Indicators online.  Notes: AZE: Azerbaijan, CHN: China, IRQ: Iraq, TUV: Tuvalu and 
ZWE: Zimbabwe.
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has often been investigated empirically, but no robust relationship has been found 5 
Rodrik (2007) believes that democracy is a meta institution that helps foster many 
other institutions that are important for growth, such as control of corruption and 
effective governments  However, also in this area the empirical evidence is weak  The 
establishment of representative elections does not guarantee that corruption is re-
duced or that patronage relations and clientelism are weakened  On the other hand, 
effective institutions have come about in authoritarian countries, like Hong Kong and 
Singapore (Holmberg, Rothstein, and Nasaritousi, 2009)  Chang shows, in a historical 
study, that today’s developed countries had a more authoritarian system in their early 
stages of development than low-income countries have now (Chang, 2002)  China is 
of course a good example today 
There is also other evidence  Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) argue that institutions do 
not change very quickly  For this reason, they examine the effect of their 1996 meas-
ure of rule of law (the first year available) on average growth per capita during the 
years 1970 and 2000  They find a positive effect  The effect becomes stronger when 
rule of law is instrumented with settler mortality rates, just like Acemoglu et al  (2001) 
did before  From this, and eliminating other explanations for the stronger relation-
ship in the instrumental variable regression, they conclude that the effect of growth 
on the rule of law, so the reverse relationship, must be negative  Arndt and Oman 
(2006) have questioned this last conclusion  They use the same 1996 data for rule 
of law, the same period for the growth rates and the same instrumental variables 
as Kaufmann and Kraay (2002), but they added more variables that may influence 
growth  They also more explicitly estimate the reverse effect, namely the effect of 
economic development on rule of law, by using infant mortality rates in 1970 as an 
instrumental variable for GDP levels in 1970  They find significant relationships for 
both relationships: rule of law positively influences growth, and level of development 
positively influences rule of law  
However, as argued above, the validity of settler mortality rates as instrument for 
rule of law is highly questionable  Excluding the instrumental variable regression, 
the proof of a positive effect of governance on growth relies on the assumption that 
good governance indicators have not changed between 1970 and 1996  This is very 
unlikely  If there is any truth in the argument that inadequate institutions are ham-
pering growth in current developing countries, there should be a positive relationship 
between institutional quality and economic growth in subsequent years  When this is 
done, a more consistent picture emerges from the literature, showing that there is no 
causal effect of WGI indicators and economic growth 
Kurtz and Schrank (2007), for example, show that the WGI indicator government ef-
fectiveness does not have a significant effect on economic growth per capita in a 
subsequent period of two years  They examined the effect of government effective-
ness scores in 1996, 1998 and 2000, and controlled for initial GDP per capita, lagged 
growth rates, investment rates and education  Khan (2012) shows that developing 
countries and emerging market economies with high growth between 1990 and 2003 
5   Review studies include (De Haan & Siermann, 1995; Doucouliagos & Ulubasoglu, 2006) 
Explanations
Of course, I am not the first to study this relationship  There is a huge amount of theo-
retical and empirical literature  North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) argue that political 
stability is important for development, and that this can be achieved in either closed 
or open societies  In closed societies, a small elite controls all political and economic 
power, whereas in open societies essentially anyone can contribute to and benefit 
from development, based on capacities  These authors suggest that open societies, 
where governments operate in an impartial way and where the power of govern-
ments is checked by other powers, enjoy more economic growth than other countries  
If true, governance indicators like rule of law and also democracy (voice and account-
ability) should be good predictors of long-run economic growth  In the same line, 
Acemoglu and Robinson argue in their recent book “Why nations fail” that inclusive 
institutions are necessary for long-run growth  In countries with inclusive institutions 
political rights are broadly distributed, governments are responsive to citizens, and 
most people can take advantage of economic opportunities  The opposite is extrac-
tive institutions  Countries with extractive institutions, such as China today, may only 
experience growth temporarily and this growth will not be sustainable (Acemoglu 
and Robinson, 2012)  
While the arguments developed in these books may be strong and they are under-
pinned by numerous historical descriptions, it is difficult to prove these arguments 
on long-run growth empirically  The problem is that indicators for these governance 
concepts are only available for the last couple of decades  Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2001) have tried to deal with this by instrumenting the rule of law  This 
means they first use a proxy variable to estimate the extent of rule of law, and then 
use the results of this regression in a second regression to estimate the effect of rule 
of law on growth  Many current developing countries and emerging markets have 
been colonies in the past  The authors hypothesise that countries where colonisers 
have settled, have better rule of law than countries where the colonisers were only in-
terested in removing valuable raw materials  Based on this, they use historical settler 
mortality rates to estimate where the colonisers have settled  The lower these rates, 
the more likely it is that colonisers have settled  With this instrument, they find that 
better rule of law leads to higher growth rates 
However, the use of settler mortality rates as proof is highly questionable (Khan, 
2012)  Their method appears sophisticated but ultimately rests on the assumption 
that colonies where Europeans settled had better rule of law than other colonies  
However, the fact that settler colonies such as US, Canada, Australia)did better may 
have been due as well to the human capital that settlers brought with them (Glaeser, 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2004)  In addition, Khan shows that Acemog-
lu et al  (2001) turn colonial history on its head: when settlers came property rights of 
indigenous peoples have first been destroyed, and settlers have often used extensive 
violence in order to do so (Khan, 2012) 
The ideas of open access societies (North et al , 2009) and of inclusive institutions 
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012) are related to ‘rule of law’ but also to ‘voice and 
accountability’ (democracy)  The relation between democracy and economic growth 
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Many indicators not only reflect institutions or processes but also policies, and these 
policies also have a pro-market bias  This is already clear from the formulation of the 
governance dimension captured by government effectiveness and quality of regula-
tion: “the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound 
policies”  Arguably, sound policies should not influence a measure of institutional 
quality  Furthermore, what is considered ‘sound’ is again defined as in keeping with a 
free market ideology: trade liberalization, the absence of state-directed credits, free 
access for foreign investors and open public sector procurement  This precludes stra-
tegic interventions of governments, which have proven to be so important in the now 
developed countries (Amsden, 2007; Chang, 2002; Chang, 2009) 
The World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), one of the under-
lying sources for the WGI indicators, is also still heavily influenced by the ideas behind 
the structural adjustment policies of the 1980s and 1990s  Eliza van Waeyenberghe 
(2009) has shown that the experts who have to make the scores are referred to diag-
nostic reports such as the World Bank’s (IFC) Doing business, Diagnostic Trade Integra-
tion Studies, Investment Climate Assessments, Administrative Barriers Reports, and 
Financial Sector assessments  All of these fully reflect the idea that less government 
intervention is always better  
Even if policies are not directly assessed, it is likely that expert judgments on insti-
tutions will be influenced by policies or even outcomes  Experts will tend to score 
countries with high growth better on their institutional quality than countries with 
lower growth (Grindle, 2004; Rothstein and Teorell, 2008)  Experts can be expected to 
use other well-known sources in making their own judgements, and often they are 
explicitly asked to do so (Arndt and Oman, 2006) 
These problems of subjectivity, private sector bias, and herd behaviour are exacer-
bated by the way in which the various sources for the WGI are aggregated  The scores 
from the different sources for one of the WGI indicators are first standardized, and 
then weighted by the extent to which they correlate with each other 8 Since most 
sources are expert surveys developed for the private sector, and as these experts are 
also likely to be influenced by each other, this means that the private sector bias is 
dominant in the overall result (Arndt and Oman, 2006) 
Given this private sector bias in the WGI scores, we may perhaps expect a positive 
relationship between indicators such as rule of law, government effectiveness and 
regulatory quality on the investment rate  This is indeed partly confirmed  The bivari-
ate (Pearson) correlations of investment (gross capital formation in per cent of GDP, 
average over 2001-2010) with government effectiveness and rule of law in 2000 are 
0 25 and 0 32, respectively, and are significant at 5 per cent level  When regressing 
average investment rates on initial rule of law and the control variable logarithm of 
GDP per capita in 2000, the coefficient is even higher and significant at 1 per cent 
8   Technically, they use the unobserved components model (UCM)  The idea is that the scores of each of the 
different sources all reflect the same underlying unobservable dimension of governance  Those that are 
most close to this unobserved factor, get the highest weight in the aggregate score (Kaufmann et al , 
2010: 9) 
did not have better governance indicators in 1996 than countries with low growth in 
these years  He shows this for the WGI indicators ‘voice and accountability’, ‘control of 
corruption’ and ‘rule of law’  Our results shown above use the same control variables 
as Arndt and Oman (2006), but compare WGI indicators 2000 with average per capita 
growth rates in the ten years after that  All in all, there is convincing evidence that 
institutional quality, at least, as measured by WGI indicators, is not having an effect 
on economic growth  
Indeed, several authors claim that the reverse relationship is more likely: economic de-
velopment fosters the development of good institutions  Today’s developed countries 
had a much lower level of institutional development (in terms of property rights, rule 
of law and control of corruption) than do today’s developing countries  Yet, this lower 
institutional development did not prevent them from experiencing growth, and they 
developed better institutions along the way (Chang, 2002; Chang, 2011; Goldsmith, 
2007)  Yet, the counterintuitive results on the effect of institutions on growth may 
also be caused by the way ‘good governance’ or ‘institutional quality’ is measured  
The indicators
Several authors have pointed to weaknesses in the measurement of these indicators  
Virtually all sources used in the WGI indicators are based on perceptions 6 Most are 
based on expert perceptions, relying on just one or a handful, while a minority re-
flects opinions expressed in somewhat broader population surveys  In some areas, 
indicators are fact based, such as the time it takes to register a business  For many ele-
ments of good governance, however, facts based indicators such as the existence of 
laws, do not say much, because practice may be very different from what is stipulated 
in laws (Arndt and Oman, 2006)  To some extent, reliance on perceptions is inevitable  
But perceptions are of course subjective and may suffer from respondent biases, such 
as herd behaviour  Is the Corruption Perception Index, for example, a good reflection 
of the actual existence of corruption in a country?
Furthermore, when looking at the detailed questions behind the indicators, many of 
them reflect a western or market oriented ideology  Many sources used in the WGI in-
dicators have been developed for the private sector and reflect primarily the interests 
of the (large) private sector - not those of workers or the informal sector (Arndt and 
Oman, 2006)  Under ‘regulatory quality’, for example, it is better if workers can be 
fired easily  Government effectiveness is considered higher if there is less “red tape”, 
and if there are fewer regulations for foreign investors  For this reason, government 
effectiveness in countries such as South Korea and Taiwan is not rated very highly 
(Kurtz and Schrank, 2007)  On the other hand, the measure for voice and account-
ability does not take into account the extent of transparency of election campaign 
financing, the extent of media domination by private conglomerates or the influence 
of the corporate sector on trade policies 7
6  For each of the six indicators within the WGI, voice and accountability, political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption, a variety of sources is used 
7   Based on a citation of Norman Girvan in Arndt and Oman, 2006: 71; unfortunately, the original source is 
no longer available on the web 
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aid and good governance
Foreign aid, and this lecture is on official aid, so aid from countries or from multilat-
eral organizations, can be expected to improve governance of recipient countries  
In fact, all four aid modalities may improve governance  First, aid projects may be 
aimed at improving certain aspects of governance  Examples include financial support 
to government financial management information systems, to local governments, to 
anti-corruption committees, to procurement agencies or to civil society and media  
Strengthening civil society and media is considered helpful for improving the demo-
cratic debate, but also for increasing the quality of government through strengthen-
ing the watch dogs  Second, technical assistance, on its own or in combination with 
projects, may also lead to higher quality governance  This means, for example, train-
ing of judges, of public financial managers or of the police as is currently done by the 
Netherlands in Kunduz, Afghanistan  Third, when aid is provided in the form of direct 
budget support or sector budget support, aid is accompanied by a policy dialogue in 
which donors try to influence policies and governance of the recipient government  
Fourth, donors may also have an influence on governance via the selection criteria for 
the aid allocation  For most bilateral donors, good governance is one of these criteria, 
and this also holds for the World Bank - in particular its soft loans and grants to low 
income countries  When the Bush Presidency doubled US aid flows in the middle of 
the 1990s, it did so by establishing the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA)  Coun-
tries could only qualify for this aid if they had good policies and if they met strict good 
governance criteria 
So, what is the evidence? At macro level, the evidence is not very positive for the ef-
fects of aid on governance  Several authors have examined the effect of aid on the 
quality of governance  Knack (2001) and Brautigam and Knack (2004) find that aid 
had a negative effect on ‘bureaucratic quality’, one of the indicators forming part of 
the International Country Risk Guide of the Political Risk Services (PRS) Group  They 
looked at 32 African countries  Rajan and Subramanian (2007) conclude that aid has 
a negative effect on governance in an indirect way  They show that aid has a nega-
tive effect on growth in those industrial sectors that depend on the quality of gov-
ernance (Rajan and Subramanian, 2007)  Busse and Gröning (2009) also find a small 
but statistically significant negative effect of aid on the change in ‘bureaucratic qual-
ity’ between 1984 and 2004, examining 106 countries 10 Several studies find that the 
dispersion of aid over many donors and many projects increases the negative effect 
on the institutional quality of recipient countries (Acharya, Lima, and Moore, 2006; 
Knack and Rahman, 2004) 
For the relationship between aid and corruption, no consistent outcomes emerge  
Some conclude that aid increases corruption (Alesina and Weder, 1999; Knack, 2001), 
while others argued that corruption decreases thanks to aid (Tavares, 2003)  With re-
spect to the effect of aid on democracy, the results are not univocally positive either  
Goldsmith (2001) examined the impact of aid on democracy in Africa over the years 
10   All four studies instrument for aid in order to control for possible endogeneity: aid may be induced 
by low bureaucratic quality, or there may be another factor that causes both aid and low bureaucratic 
quality 
level  The same holds for government effectiveness, political stability and, to a lesser 
extent, control of corruption (Appendix Table 3) 9
This may imply that rule of law and other good governance indicators indirectly in-
fluence economic growth, namely via the investment rate  Given the negative and 
significant coefficient for ‘rule of law’ in a model explaining growth that includes the 
investment rate, we must then conclude that there may be a positive effect of rule of 
law on the volume of investment, but a negative one on the efficiency of investment  
However, it is also possible that the positive effect of rule of law on the investment 
volume just reflects the private sector bias and the strong relationship between judg-
ments on institutions, and outcomes  
Khan argues that the high growth rates in authoritarian regimes such as China and, 
earlier, many other East Asian countries, show that the kind of governance embed-
ded in the WGI indicators may not be so essential as is often thought (Khan, 2007)  He 
makes a distinction between ‘market enhancing governance’ and ‘growth enhancing 
governance’  Historically, growth enhancing governance may have been more impor-
tant than market enhancing governance  A study in which historical trajectories of 
four African and four South-east Asian countries are compared shows that the higher 
growth in South-east Asia is primarily due to different policies, and not to governance 
as usually defined by donors  There was just as much corruption in Asia as in Africa, 
and there was little difference in terms of democratic accountability (Van Donge, 
Henley, and Lewis, 2012)  
Other recent studies conclude that institutions are important part for development, 
but that there is not one preferred path (Levy and Fukuyama, 2010; Levy, 2010)  Coun-
tries in East Asia owe their high economic growth to a strong state (developmental 
state) and to centralised power, while that power was aimed at the growth of the 
nation as a whole  Only much later did they begin to develop political (democrat-
ic) and market-oriented institutions to protect property rights and the rule of law  
Other countries, such as Bangladesh, did not have such a strong state but apparently 
had ‘good enough governance’ and could achieve strong growth by changing cru-
cial aspects of policy and sometimes of governance as well  Kelsall (2011) observes 
that some African countries also enjoyed periods of high economic growth despite 
neo-patrimonial governance with corruption and clientelism  He argues that these 
experiences show that two conditions are necessary: a strong central authority that is 
focused on the long term, and a market-driven policy that benefits rural areas  This is 
clearly an area that warrants further research: research on what kind of institutions 
can foster growth and what indicators can be developed for measuring them  But it 
is clear that the so often held view that institutions must change before development 
can take place, is not tenable  
9   But not for voice and accountability, and regulatory quality 
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in negotiating with donors on projects  A typical sub Saharan African country receives 
some 400 missions per year and all donors wish to speak with government officers at 
the highest possible level  This not only means high transaction costs but also leads 
to a fragmented development policy  Donors are often only interested in the success 
of their own projects, and not in the quality of governance in general or the success 
of other donors’ projects (Acharya et al , 2006)  They provide technical assistance in 
the form of training and seminars for relevant government staff, within the country 
or abroad, leading to high absenteeism among government officers  Or donors set 
up separate implementation units for the execution of their projects, hiring the best 
government staff available and bypassing government systems  The creation of sepa-
rate implementation units for flagship projects or programs leads to “institutional 
confusion” (Dijkstra, 2004)  As O’Connor and Soludo wrote “The aid relationship can 
get stuck in a high aid- weak institutions equilibrium in which institutions remain 
weak and graduation [i e  from aid dependence - gd] never occurs ” (O’Connell and 
Soludo, 2001:1548) 
Aid dependence implies that governments are more accountable outward, i e  to do-
nors, than inward, i e  to parliaments or domestic constituencies in general (Boekesti-
jn, 2009; Moss, Petterson, and Van de Walle, 2006; Sogge, 2002)  Around 2000, aid 
flows constituted up to 50 per cent of government expenditure in many Sub Saharan 
African countries  It can be expected that governments then tend to listen more to 
donors than to their own populations  Furthermore, large aid flows may have the 
perverse effect of reducing tax efforts, which may further undermine state building  
Historically, taxation has been important in increasing the accountability and legiti-
macy of executive powers  Increases in government revenues were usually needed 
in times of war, inducing Charles Tilly to his famous expression “the state made war, 
and war made the state” 11 In a way, foreign aid plays the same negative role as the 
availability of highly valued resources such as oil  Countries with a resource curse, be 
it due to oil or aid abundance, tend to have lower levels of democratic accountability 
Some argue that aid is better than oil, because it comes with conditions and pro-
jects that attempt to improve government behaviour (Moss et al  2006) 12 However, 
it can also be argued that aid is worse than oil  Aid does not only imply money, but 
has other influences as well  It has been shown that donors have an interest in the 
continuation of an incumbent government in order to be able to continue with the 
implementation of agreed policy conditions or national development plans  As a re-
sult, they do not speak openly about corruption cases, they provide the executive 
with extra resources just before elections, or approve an IMF program 13 Or, if elec-
tions do lead to a change in government, the newly elected government finds itself 
completely bound to earlier agreed policies and is not able to implement the prom-
ised policy change  Furthermore, donors tend to define poverty reduction as a non-
political, technical issue, and in so doing they often focus on the executive power and 
11   Cited in Moss et al  (2006), p  17 
12   With the exception of more technical issues such as public finance management, in which elite interests 
are not immediately affected 
13   This has been documented, for example, for Mozambique (Hanlon, 2004), for Mali (Van de Walle, 2012) 
and for Nicaragua (Dijkstra, 2005) 
1975-1997, using the Freedom House’s ‘freedom index’  He concludes that aid had a 
positive impact on democracy  Djankov, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) used the 
Polity IV index for 108 countries and found that aid had a negative effect on democra-
cy during the period 1960-1999  More recently, Kalyvitis and Vlachaki also concluded 
that aid has a negative impact on democracy  They studied the period 1967-2002 and 
found that the effect was greater in countries with a low democratic status to begin 
with  
However, these studies cover a rather long period and the negative findings can per-
haps be explained by the Cold War  Until the end of the 1980s, many countries re-
ceived aid for strategic reasons, and these countries were often ruled by dictators  
Dunning (2004) examined the impact of the Cold War by reusing Goldsmith’s (2001) 
data but now comparing two periods: 1975-1987 and 1988-1997  He argues that the 
Soviet Union’s influence in Africa was already waning around 1987, and this also in-
fluenced western donors’ attitudes from that year onward  The aid providing coun-
tries began to emphasize political conditionality and did so in a more credible way  
The author finds that there was no significant effect of aid on democratic develop-
ment before 1987, but that this relation became positive and significant in the second 
period  Ear (2007) examined the effect of aid on the different WGI indicators for the 
period 1996-2004, so after the Cold War  She does not find any significant effect, but 
the coefficient on ‘voice and accountability’ is most positive 
Dutta, Leeson and Williamson (2011) observe that there is no consensus on the effect 
of aid on democracy  They suggest a different hypothesis: aid promotes democratic 
development in countries that are already democratic, while the opposite is true in 
countries with dictatorial traits  They analyse 124 countries for the period 1960-2009 
using the Polity IV index, and the results confirm their hypothesis  The authors con-
clude that aid has an “amplification effect”: it can reinforce certain paths, but cannot 
put the country on another path 
Explanation
In sum, the effect of aid on bureaucratic quality in recipient countries appears to 
be negative, while the evidence of the effect of aid on democracy or control of cor-
ruption is not conclusive  Again, this is counterintuitive  How can these findings be 
explained? Basically, there are three types of explanations  The first has to do with 
the unintended negative impact of aid on the administrative capacity of recipient 
countries  A second explanation is that a high aid dependence may negatively af-
fect democratic development by reducing domestic accountability  Thirdly, the above 
mentioned four possible channels for aid positively influencing governance only hold 
in so far as donors foster the right types of governance with their projects, technical 
assistance, conditions and selection criteria  As will be shown below, this is not always 
the case 
Aid may reduce the administrative capacity in recipient countries, especially if provid-
ed in high volumes and by many different donors (Brautigam and Knack, 2004; Knack, 
2001; Knack and Rahman, 2004)  Recipient country governments spend a lot of time 
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trade have been lowered, banks have been privatized and the financial sector lib-
eralized  Although some of these measures, and in particular the efforts for macro-
economic stabilization and foreign exchange liberalization were positive, many of 
the other policies had negative effects on growth and development  Some conditions 
were simply wrong and others were badly timed  Donors sometimes admitted this in 
retrospect, but they have never compensated the aid recipient country for the dam-
age done  What’s more, when African countries could not repay the earlier structural 
adjustment loans, (partly) due to the wrong policy conditions attached to them that 
had put their economies further behind, the donors/creditors were only willing to 
grant debt relief if the same countries would again carry out market oriented policies  
Instead of taking their losses and recognizing that earlier policy conditionality had 
turned out to be a failure, the donors/creditors imposed more policy conditions  
While Asian countries experienced high growth rates during the 1980s and 1990s with 
extensive state controls over foreign trade, foreign investment, and domestic credit 
and labour markets, the countries that followed structural adjustment policies in Afri-
ca and Latin America displayed much lower growth rates  Examples abound of specific 
policies that turned out to have a negative impact on long-term development  One 
of these policies was the introduction of user fees for basic education, which led to a 
precipitous fall in primary enrolments rates across Africa, and which in most countries 
has now been abolished (Glennie, 2008)  Another example is trade liberalization, for 
which IMF and World Bank conditionality has proven to be important (Jones, Mor-
rissey, and Nelson, 2011)  It is by no means clear, however, that trade liberalization 
always fosters development  To the contrary, most currently rich countries have used 
protection in order to develop their industries (Amsden, 2007; Chang, 2002) 
In Ghana, the Parliament had just approved a new budget law for 2003, which includ-
ed higher tariffs for rice and poultry in order to protect domestic producers against 
cheap imports  These tariffs were still within the range allowed by World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) rules  However, when the government negotiated with the IMF on 
a new programme, the IMF forced the government to abolish the tariff increases  
Subsequently, cheap European imports of chicken flooded the market and destroyed 
local production  By 2007, 97 per cent of domestically consumed chicken and 70 per 
cent of rice is imported, while this was only 10 per cent twenty years before (Glennie, 
2008: 54) 
In Mozambique, the cashew nut processing industries first had to be privatized and 
then the World Bank required the export tax on raw nuts to be reduced  The idea 
was that the producers of raw nuts would get a higher price, but the effect was that 
all cashew nuts were exported to India to be processed there  It meant the end of 
the just privatized cashew nut processing industry  Later, the World Bank came to the 
conclusion that some protection of processing firms was justified, given that all coun-
tries with processing industries, most notably India, also applied protection  The World 
Bank then approved an increase in the export tax  However, the damage had been 
done  The new owners of the processing companies have not been compensated for 
the losses suffered, and no money has as yet become available for restructuring and re-
building the companies (McMillan, Rodrik, and Welch, 2004; White and Dijkstra, 2003)  
ignore political processes in which also the less powerful can make themselves heard  
In Lesotho, aid proved to strengthen bureaucratic state power at the cost of the poor 
peasants for which it originally was intended (Ferguson, 1990)  In Rwanda, aid in 
the early 1990s proved to reinforce existing socioeconomic and ethnic inequalities  
This contributed to the “structural violence” that later erupted as real racial violence, 
leading to one of the most brutal explosions of violence in history in 1994 (Uvin, 
1998)  Van de Walle (2012) shows that donors in the Mali of the years before the coup 
focused too much on the executive branch of government, gave too little attention 
to mechanisms of horizontal accountability, and turned a blind eye to already existing 
threats to democracy 14
This links to the third type of explanation, and that is that donors may not always 
be promoting the most adequate types of governance  A World Bank evaluation of 
public sector reform concludes that the lack of success of civil service and administra-
tive reforms can be attributed to a “lack of diagnostic work” in this area, thereby 
implicitly acknowledging that proposed reforms were not always adequate for the 
local situation (IEG, 2008)  Dorotinsky and Floyd (2004) find in a study of 20 coun-
tries that the public financial management reforms introduced by donors were often 
too complicated  Countries had to introduce medium term expenditure frameworks, 
activity based budgeting, performance management and integrated financial infor-
mation systems all at once  In practice, this reduced the chances of success 15 More 
in general, donors usually believe that countries should implement the entire list of 
conditions for good governance, while good results could probably be achieved with 
‘good enough governance’ (Grindle, 2004)  However, this does not exclude that do-
nor efforts have beneficial effects on governance  Indeed, there is evidence of micro 
interventions having positive effects on the reduction of corruption, on democratic 
accountability or on the functioning of the police 16 
A third paradox
Apart from attempting to influence governance, donors also have a long record of try-
ing to influence policies  This reveals a third paradox  While donors say they promote 
democracy, they often try to impose policies on unwilling parliaments and unwilling 
populations  Furthermore, the policy conditions have not always been beneficial for 
the recipient’s economy  Who is going to be accountable for these policies?
During the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s, many developing countries have adopted the 
policies required by World Bank and IMF adjustment programs  This often occurred 
with long delays and sometimes policies were only implemented partially or cosmeti-
cally  But after two decades of these structural 
adjustment programs, government expenditure has been cut, foreign exchange mar-
kets have been liberalized, state industries have been privatized, tariffs on foreign 
14   In this country, aid to increase the demand for and the support of democratic institutions proved to 
constitute only 1per cent of total aid during the years 2000-2010 
15   Cited in De Renzio (2006)
16   See Banerjee and Duflo (2011) and Hanna, Bishop, Nadel, Scheffler, and Durlacher (2011) for these, and 
much more, examples  
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national systems and priorities 17 In practice, however, progress toward these objec-
tives has been slow, especially on the donor side (Wood et al , 2011)  Donors often 
have difficulties in harmonizing procedures, and they focused more on harmonizing 
their agendas  As a result, the new aid approach has led to more, not less, donor in-
terference in recipient countries’ policies (Dijkstra and Komives, 2011; Whitfield, 2009; 
Woll, 2008) 18 
Another way in which the policy agendas of donors still influence recipient countries 
is through selectivity  The World Bank allocates its soft loans to low income countries 
on the basis of the CPIA, and the score on ‘governance’ has the highest weight in 
the overall score  As reported above, the benchmarks used for these scores are heav-
ily influenced by pro-market ideas (Van Waeyenberghe, 2009)  An evaluation of the 
World Bank itself concludes that while there is an association between CPIA scores 
and loan performance (measured as the percentage of problem loans registered by 
IEG), there is no empirical justification for giving a higher weight to the governance 
cluster (IEG, 2009)  
Looking beyond aid allocation or aid practices, it is clear that donors use various other 
channels for influencing policies in low income countries  Although the WTO officially 
decides on the basis of consensus, in practice rich countries have a lot more influence 
than poor countries  And rich countries’ interventions in the WTO are dominated by 
corporate interests (Peet, 2009) 19 Many of the WTO rules favour the rich countries 
because they do not allow the current developing countries to raise trade barriers 
or access new technologies cheaply – as was standard practice in the early years of 
the now developed countries (Chang, 2002)  For example, the patent rules agreed in 
the WTO protect vested corporate interests in the rich countries, at the cost of other 
countries’ rights to set up their own industries  Some protection of intellectual prop-
erty rights is of course beneficial for stimulating innovation, but 20 years is generally 
considered too much (Bhagwati, 2004)  Now that multilateral trade talks in the Doha 
round are stalled, rich countries attempt to further their interests by establishing bi-
lateral agreements with groups of low income countries  In these negotiations the 
position of the low income countries is weaker than in multilateral talks, because 
these interests are not defended by countries like China and India  As a result, the 
rich countries attempt to impose open government procurement and further trade 
and investment liberalization in poor countries  The EU does so in the context of the 
Economic Partnership Agreements with groups of poor countries  This further reduces 
the policy space 
17   During various high level meetings (Rome 2003, Paris 2005, Accra 2008 and Busan 2011) donors and 
recipients pledged to strive for more donor harmonization, for more alignment to recipient countries’ 
systems and policies, and for more ownership (OECD, 2005) 
18   That the contents of conditions has not changed much is clear from the conditions imposed on Greece  
They go far beyond what is necessary for macro-economic stabilization and include privatizations and 
liberalizations of the economy (Volkskrant 25 October 2012)  
19   I was able to see this in practice during a visit to the Permanent Representation of the Netherlands in 
Geneva  When the Dutch officer prepared a WTO meeting on a Trade Policy Report about an African 
country, he asked for the opinion of a major Dutch investor in that country  As a result, the Dutch criti-
cized the local content rules for foreign investors that this country had introduced – and so did other EU 
countries in the same meeting, as they had also been informed by “their” companies  
During the 1980s, Zambia often reversed on agreed structural adjustment policies, 
but this changed in 1991  The country then agreed on a new IMF programme and 
implemented a full package of liberalization measures, including financial liberali-
zation  This was an example of bad sequencing  The financial sector was liberalized 
before the government budget had been straightened out and before inflation had 
fallen  This led to huge capital flight, accompanied by low growth and by an increase 
in inflation (White and Dijkstra, 2003)  But this was not all  Zambia also liberalized 
the maize market on the assumption that this would lead to more efficiency  How-
ever, given fluctuations in production due to unpredictable rains, the absence of a 
market clearing institution that could stabilize prices led to a decline in maize produc-
tion (Van Donge, 2007)  Zambian growth was negative during the full decade of the 
1990s, while foreign debt continued to increase  All the time, the response of IMF and 
World Bank was that further reforms were necessary  By the end of the 1990s, and 
in order to access the debt relief initiative for heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC), 
the country finally conceded to privatize the copper mines  This proved to be particu-
larly harmful, especially in combination with very low taxes - due to the concessions 
the government had to make in order to attract buyers  The new owners severely 
underinvested for several years (Van Donge, 2007)  Now that the copper price is high 
again, the Zambian government does not have any benefit of it (Glennie, 2008: 41)  
Zambia, and also Malawi, have later reintroduced government intervention in their 
agricultural sectors, with high agricultural growth as result 
Yet another example refers to the banking sector  Many developing countries were 
forced to privatize their banks before adequate regulation and supervision of these 
banks was in place  The new owners, often related to government officers, began 
to take excessive risks in lending, often to their own companies  It did not take long 
before these banks were in big trouble  Government then had to rescue these banks 
and this led to rapid increases in the governments’ domestic debts (Dijkstra, 2008) 
Glennie (2008) argues that the aid conditions have been more detrimental for Africa’s 
development than the aid resources may have been beneficial  This may or may not 
be true  But in any case, donors have been quite contradictory in dealing with Afri-
can countries  Donors tell governments to be democratic, but at the same time they 
force these countries to implement certain policies, often implying that parliaments 
approve certain laws  Furthermore, while trade liberalization has been enforced on 
poor countries against unwilling parliaments, clearly favouring rich countries’ com-
panies, rich countries hide behind arguments of “democracy” or “sovereignty” when 
their companies can invest in poor countries without abiding by environmental or 
labour standards  This begs the question of the interests behind the donors’ good 
governance paradigm 
Still imposing policies?
Now, it could be argued that these attempts to influence policies are something of 
the past  Most donors officially say that they do not practice conditionality anymore  
According to the new aid rhetoric of the 2000s, donors would respect recipient coun-
try ownership, would harmonize their aid procedures and would align their aid with 
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conclusion
At the macro level, I showed that there is no evidence of a positive effect of the usu-
ally employed good governance indicators on economic development  This was a first 
paradox, because it is counterintuitive and contradicts some earlier research  But I 
also showed that the contents of these good governance indicators may be some-
what biased towards values that tend to favour the free market  More research is 
necessary in this area  Defining good governance always implies value judgments, but 
research should help to further unravel the judgments behind the current indicators  
In addition, research could help improving the validity of the indicators for those con-
cepts and dimensions that are considered important  We must also get more insight 
into which elements of the donors’ good governance agenda are really essential for 
economic development  In my current and future research, I intend to contribute to 
both of these research lines  With my colleagues in the department of Public Admin-
istration, I hope to contribute to an exploration of the validity and usefulness of the 
Sustainable Governance Indicators (ranking 31 OECD countries) and the Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index (ranking 128 non-OECD countries) of the Bertelsmann Founda-
tion in Gütersloh, Germany  Moreover, PhD student André Loozekoot has scrutinized 
a widely used assessment framework for public financial management and account-
ability, and he will shortly start field work in Zambia and Uganda on the factors influ-
encing improvements in public accountability mechanisms 
My second paradox was about the effect of aid on good governance  There is limited 
evidence at the macro level of aid having played a positive role for good governance: 
the effect of aid on bureaucratic quality is outright negative and for the effect of aid 
on democratization the evidence is inconclusive  However, this does not exclude that 
individual projects or technical assistance do have a positive effect on governance  My 
current secondment with IOB gives me an opportunity to explore whether this is the 
case  Denise Bergkamp and I intend to investigate the effectiveness of direct donor 
efforts to promote democracy, the justice system, good local governance and public 
finance management and transparency 
I also showed that aid comes with strings and that the policy conditions and selection 
criteria that come with aid have often focused, at least partly, on the wrong poli-
cies and institutions  While donor rhetoric emphasizes the need for countries to have 
democratically elected and accountable governments, the practice of attaching spe-
cific policy conditions to the aid resources undermines these objectives  Furthermore, 
it reduces the policy space that countries need in order to map out their own growth 
path  The debates on the relation between aid and governance, and indeed the de-
bate on aid effectiveness in general often overlooks these negative consequences of 
aid, that also go beyond the aid system itself 
Of course, aid is not always bad  There is plenty of evidence that aid flows in the 
past five decades have contributed to reduced mortality rates and better schooling, 
among other achievements  A recently completed policy review of general budget 
support has shown that budget support has helped governments to spend more 
on health and education (Dijkstra, de Kemp, and Bergkamp, 2012)  In addition, the 
Of course, trade is important for development  But “trade“ is a very ambiguous term, 
as it refers to both exports and imports  While developing countries should be al-
lowed to export more to our markets, the current emphasis is on our exports to their 
markets  This is much less in the interest of poor countries  In the early stages of de-
velopment of European (but also the US, and East Asian) countries, they were allowed 
to use import tariffs, investment regulation and other government intervention  This 
policy space has been taken by larger countries such as China, India, and Brazil, but 
the aid system has not allowed the same space for African countries  This is bad global 
governance  
26    pa r a d o x e s  a r o u n d g o o d g o v e r n a n c e  |  p r o f .  d r .  a .  g e s k e  d i j k s t r a     27 
acknowledgments
Ladies and gentlemen  My career did not start in Rotterdam  I received my education 
in Groningen, and after being affiliated with the University of El Salvador, the Open 
University, the University of Maastricht and the Institute of Social Studies (ISS), my 
coming to Erasmus University happened more or less by accident  Nevertheless the 
department of Public Administration has always tolerated my rather exotic research 
interests very pleasantly  And more than that: interesting cross-fertilization soon came 
about, and there is growing mutual learning and acknowledging of each others’ 
strengths  I have come to consider Public Administration, in all its diversity, an inter-
esting perspective on reality  This growing mutual recognition is also reflected in my 
appointment, with not only ‘governance’, but also ‘global development’ in the title    
Firstly, I would like to thank all those who have contributed to my appointment  These 
include the rector and board of this university, the board of the Trust Fund Erasmus 
University Rotterdam, the dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences, the chair of the De-
partment of Public Administration and the Standing Committee on Career policy for 
scientific staff (Dutch acronym VCL) of the Faculty of Social Sciences   I thank them all 
for the trust they have placed in me  
I am also grateful to have been able to participate in the first Master class for female 
Associate Professors at campus Woudestein of this University  The contacts with my 
fellow participants were very stimulating  Five out of eight of us have now been ap-
pointed professor - albeit two of them in other universities   I thank Ton Dietz for 
some stimulating conversations on my career in the years after the Master class, and 
in particular for his advice on the title of this chair  
Of course a special word of thanks is due to Kees van Paridon, under whose formal 
leadership I have been working at Erasmus University from the start  At first, this was 
within the section ‘economics’; later, the sections were abolished and Kees became 
chair of the Public Administration department  I thank him for his pleasant manage-
rial style: unselfish, with humour, and with a good sense of human relations  From 
the beginning I was struck by the good work atmosphere in the department, and 
the fact that this atmosphere continues to be good can, for a major part, certainly be 
credited to Kees  For more than a year I have had the pleasure of co-managing the 
department as its treasurer  With the somewhat reduced student enrolments and an 
upcoming move – with the accompanying threat of the “new working” – this is cer-
tainly a challenge  But I look forward to taking up this gage together, of course also 
with the other board members 
The students, and in particular those of the Master in International Public Manage-
ment and Policy, are a great source of inspiration  I look forward to new discussions in 
class, in thesis groups and also in Geneva during the annual study trip to international 
organizations 
For over twenty years now, I have been able to conduct many interesting studies for 
organisations active in development cooperation  I am grateful to these organizations 
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ening local institutions, in particular in public finance management  Despite this evi-
dence that budget support is a more effective instrument, the Dutch government does 
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often seem to ignore evidence about what works in aid  Studying and explaining aid 
practices and motivations will therefore continue to have my interest  PhD student 
Anna Jüngen is examining the factors influencing the aid allocation  Among other 
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The questionable effects of aid on governance at the macro level also imply that 
research on aid effectiveness should not be limited to measuring the effectiveness 
of aid interventions - as recently seems to have become the holy grail in aid evalua-
tion  Just like in medical science, development effectiveness research now preferably 
uses randomized control trials  It assesses the effects of a particular intervention on 
a particular target group, controlling for other factors by comparing with a control 
group and using difference-in-difference methods  In this way, studies have been able 
to conclude, for example, that providing school meals in pre-schools in Kenya raised 
attendance rates from 21 to 29 per cent, or that poor families receiving cash transfers 
in Malawi are eating better than families not included in the programme, or that 
providing anti-malaria bed nets for free does not reduce their usage 20 This is very 
useful  However, this type of studies can only be part of the research agenda on aid ef-
fectiveness  Aid interventions are no medicines, and randomized control trials do not 
take the wider social, political and institutional effects of aid into account that have 
proven to be so important  In my research program, I intend to continue investigating 
the institutional and political effects of aid and of the global governance institutions 
of which the aid system is a part  
20   Much more examples can be found in Banerjee and Duflo (2011); Hanlon, Barrientos, and Hulme (2010) 
and IEG (2009) 
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Appendix Table 1. 
OLS regressions with dependent variable: Average growth per capita, 2001-2010
CONSTANT
3 204 
(0 052)
2 428 
(0 176)
3 708 
(0 076)
3 500 
(0 051)
2 087 
(0 307)
2 757 
(0 139)
INV/GDP (%)
0 154 
(0 000)
0 170 
(0 000)
0 158 
(0 000)
0 155 
(0 000)
0 174 
(0 000)
0 160 
(0 000)
POP GROWTH
-0 701 
(0 000)
-0 658 
(0 000)
-0 636 
(0 001)
-0 626 
(0 001)
-0 601 
(0 001)
-0 622 
(0 001)
LGDPPC2000
-0 422 
(0 027)
-0 369 
(0 062)
-0 502 
(0 026)
-0 468 
(0 022)
-0 360 
(0 094)
-0 403 
(0 051)
VOICE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY
-0.669 
(0.022)
POLITICAL STABILITY
-0.678 
(0.017)
GOVERNMENT 
EFFECTIVENESS
-0 368 
(0 407)
REGULATORY QUALITY
-0 474 
(0 155)
RULE OF LAW
-0.748 
(0.048)
CONTROL OF 
CORRUPTION
-0 774 
(0 058)
F
13 914 
(0 000)
14 223
12 244 
(0 000)
12 722 
(0 000)
13 414 
(0 000)
13 291 
(0 000)
ADJ R2 0 301 0 308 0 273 0 281 0 293 0 291
N 120 119 120 120 120 120
Note: Coefficients are shown, with p values in parenthesis.
Appendix Table 2. 
OLS regressions with dependent variable: Change in HDI 2010-2000
CONSTANT 0 037 (0 000) 0 038 (0 000) 0 036 (0 000)
AVG GROWTH PER CAPITA 0 005 (0 000) 0 005 (0 000) 0 006 (0 000)
VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY -0 005 (0 023)
POLITICAL STABILITY -0 003 (0 111)
GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS -0 005 (0 082)
F 29 945 (0 000) 24 867 (0 000) 29 169 (0 000)
ADJ R2 0 360 0 321 0 358
N 103 101 101
Note: coefficients are shown, with p values in parenthesis.
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Appendix Table 3. 
OLS regressions with dependent variable: Average Investment/GDP 2001-2010, in %
CONSTANT 27 557 (0 000) 32 307 (0 000) 32 185 (0 000) 25 522 (0 000)
LGDP PER CAPITA 2000 -0 493 (0 394) -1 054 (0 094) -1 014 (0 084) -0 202 (0 739)
POLITICAL STABILITY 2 762 (0 001)
GOVERNMENT 
EFFECTIVENESS
4 848 (0 000)
RULE OF LAW 4 538 (0 000)
CONTROL OF 
CORRUPTION
2 724 (0 029)
F 6 352 (0 002) 8 589 (0 000) 10 969 (0 000) 3 116 (0 048)
ADJ R2 0 082 0 111 0 141 0 034
N 120 121 121 121
Notes: coefficients are shown, with p values in parenthesis. When voice and accountability, and 
regulatory quality are included, the estimated model (the F) is not significant. 
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